While I can agree with much of what Antony Davies said (although I'm less
sanguine about vouchers than he is, but that's a debate for another day), I
think his solution is off-target.
The problem is the schools have an incentive--to achieve acceptable pass rates
on the PSAE, with negative potential consequences if pass rates are not high
enough. The schools, for whatever reason (I don't know how Illinois law works
here; it may be legislative), apparently do not use student results on the
PSAE to determine anything about student outcomes. So students have little
incentive to take the test seriously. (Contrast that with Indiana, where
students have to perform aceptably on a standardized test, called ISTEP, to
graduate.)
Antony's solution does not address that, except perhaps inferentially, with
the potential of creating a grass-roots movement against the PASE. His
solution will (might) also provide a different sort of pool of information
about the quality of the product being produced by schools (although I might
also suggest surveying employers, looking at student success in the first year
of college, and other metrics).
The question is how to design a system in which students' incentives are
aligned with teachers' and administrators' incentives, given the current legal
enviornment in Illinois. My only suggestion, within those constraints, is to
make the PASE scores count for student outcomes.
Donald A. Coffin
Associate Professor of Economics
Indiana University Northwest
Gary, IN 46408
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